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NO. 36 JUNE 2021 Introduction 
First Summit of the Anti-China Coalition 
Cornwall G7 Highlights BRICS Weakness 
Heribert Dieter 
The 2021 G7 Summit of the heads of state and government of the seven leading indus-
trial nations (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, United States, United Kingdom) 
will be held in Cornwall, UK, from 11 to 13 June. As host, British Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson has placed future relations with China at the top of the agenda. That priori-
tisation is reflected in the guest list: Australia, India, South Korea and South Africa. 
The Cornwall G7 has been set up to develop a broad alliance against an increasingly 
aggressive China. The German government tends to play up China’s economic signifi-
cance and risks slipping into an outsider role, enabling a totalitarian state for eco-
nomic gain. 
 
The Summit’s motto “Build Back Better” 
sounds innocuous and constructive. As the 
Covid-19 pandemic becomes manageable, 
the leading industrial nations are thinking 
about the shape of the expected recovery 
and the question of tackling future pan-
demics. While these are undeniably impor-
tant, the crucial question for the 2021 G7 
is: How should the other six position them-
selves in the new Cold War between China 
and G7 member United States? 
The question ensues from the massive 
transformation of China’s foreign and ex-
ternal economic policy. President Xi Jin-
ping’s line of reducing China’s dependency 
on the global economy has significant 
implications for the OECD countries. And 
the country’s push for economic autonomy 
presages another transformation of the 
international division of labour and dispels 
any illusion that it might be on the path to 
a market economy. 
China is seeking a degree of self-isola-
tion, and is simultaneously asserting its 
interests much more forcefully than during 
most of the first three decades after its 
economic opening at the end of the 1970s. 
This is more than noisy rhetoric: Beijing’s 
actions contravene treaties and interna-
tional law. It was the violation of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration of 1984, which 
granted special status to the former British 
colony of Hong Kong, that led most of the 
G7 governments to reconsider their assess-
ment of Beijing’s reliability. 
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Johnson Channels Trump 
This applies especially to the British govern-
ment and Prime Minister Boris Johnson. So 
much has changed since 2015, when Xi was 
given a royal welcome in London and the 
rare honour of being invited to address both 
chambers of parliament. Queen Elizabeth 
and General Secretary Xi drove to Bucking-
ham Palace in the Diamond Jubilee State 
Coach. The two governments spoke of a 
“golden era” in their bilateral relationship. 
That all changed in 2019, with protests 
in Hong Kong followed by the imposition 
of a draconian new security law on 30 June 
2020. As well as criticism of Beijing, London 
also altered its visa rules to offer all Hong 
Kong citizens eligible for the so-called “Brit-
ish National (Overseas)” passport a path to 
permanent settlement in the United King-
dom. This applies to about three million 
people, or about 40 percent of Hong Kong’s 
population today. That alone demonstrates 
the dismal state of the bilateral relationship. 
This generous offer to take in so many 
Hong Kong citizens is all the more striking, 
given that control over immigration was 
one of the central motives of the Brexit 
debate. Resettling these Hong Kong citizens 
could become the biggest such migration 
since the expulsion of about 30,000 East 
African Asians from Uganda and Kenya in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. This time, 
though, there is little objection to the plans, 
with British opinion polls showing two-
thirds support. 
Boris Johnson does not mind offending 
Beijing, which regards the visa question 
as interference in China’s internal affairs. 
Johnson’s stance appears to be driven not 
only by British ire over violations of the 
1984 Treaty but also a belief that the geo-
political escalation compels London to take 
a stand. 
Johnson’s invitation to Australia, India, 
South Africa and South Korea originates 
in a proposal made by President Donald 
Trump exactly a year ago. Trump called for 
the establishment of a G11, comprising the 
G7 plus Australia, India, South Korea and 
Russia. Johnson co-opted the idea of form-
ing a democratic counterweight to China, 
simply replacing Russia with South Africa. 
The British prime minister’s decision to 
invite countries especially affected by Chi-
nese aggression sends a message to Beijing: 
the Western industrial nations are not pre-
pared to turn a blind eye to its aggression. 
China’s support is on the wane across 
the world, nowhere more so than in the 
United States. There is now a broad public 
consensus – extending well beyond the 
Beltway – that it is time to “stand up to 
China”. China is increasingly seen as the 
central challenge not only for the United 
States but for the entire Western world. 
China’s Popularity Slipping 
Beijing is losing friends over its foreign 
policy. A survey in the G7 countries 
in autumn 2020 found clear majorities 
holding negative views on China, ranging 
from 62 percent in Italy to 86 percent in 
Japan. Growing mistrust towards China has 
become the central issue of international 
politics. 
Responsibility for this decline in standing 
lies in the first place at the door of Presi-
dent Xi Jinping, who has abandoned the 
caution of his predecessors and encouraged 
a cult of personality not seen since the era 
of Mao Zedong. Xi takes a hard line domes-
tically and internationally, provoking ten-
sions that affect not only relations with the 
United States but also with two of the coun-
tries invited to Cornwall: Australia and India. 
Diverging Economic Interests 
within the G7 
Exports are often regarded as an indicator 
of economic performance, although export 
concentration can also make an economy 
highly vulnerable. The G7 nations and their 
guests in Cornwall differ in their degree of 
dependency on exports to China. 
Australia, South Korea and Japan all 
depend on China for a significant share 
of their overall exports, while the United 
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States comes ahead of Germany. None of 
those countries, nor France or the United 
Kingdom show any reticence over conflict 
with China, as evidenced by their willing-
ness to maintain a military presence in the 
Pacific. 
A slightly different picture emerges in 
the absolute figures. Germany is Europe’s 
biggest exporter to China, although only 
slightly ahead of Australia, which has less 
than one-third of Germany’s population. 
Germany’s large export volume is often 
cited as a justification for its soft line 
towards China, but this does not actually 
stand up to scrutiny. In fact in 2019 trade 
with Poland and Hungary was larger than 
trade with China. 
So Germany is not in fact excessively 
dependent on China. Yet Beijing possesses 
no better advocate in Europe. This was seen 
very clearly at the end of 2020 during the 
German EU Council Presidency, when Ber-
lin prioritised passage of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment 
over Washington’s objections. 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 does suggest 
reasons why France and the United King-
dom might feel free to pursue a more reso-
lute line than Germany. But both the United 
States and Australia have a great deal to 
lose, without that deterring them from 
practicing a value-based foreign policy and 
responding firmly to violations of inter-
national law. 
Test Case Australia 
Australia is extremely dependent on ex-
ports to China and has experienced massive 
political intimidation. That puts a special 
edge to Canberra’s invitation to Cornwall. 
In fact Beijing has worked to intimidate and 
blackmail many countries in recent years; 
South Korea and Sweden to name but two. 
In November 2020 the Chinese embassy 
in Canberra demanded that the Australian 
government address a list of fourteen griev-
ances. The complaints included funding 
supposedly “anti-China” research at the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Aus-
tralia’s positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Xinjiang; its call for an independent 
investigation of the origins of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus; the ban on Huawei technology 
 
Table 1 
Merchandise exports to China in 2020, 
G7 members and guests, share of total 
exports (percent) 
 
 Country Exports  
 Australia  39.7  
 South Korea  25.9  
 Japan  22.0  
 South Africa  11.5  
 United States  8.7  
 Germany  8.0  
 India  6.9  
 Canada  4.8  
 United Kingdom  4.7  
 France  4.1  
 Italy  3.0  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Di-




Merchandise exports to China in 2020 
(US$ billion) 
 
 Country Exports  
 Japan  140.5  
 South Korea  132.6  
 United States  124.6  
 Germany  110.4  
 Australia  100.0  
 France  20.1  
 India  18.9  
 Canada  18.8  
 United Kingdom  18.6  
 Italy  14.8  
 South Africa  9.9  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Di-
rection of Trade Statistics, own calculations. 
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in the Australian 5G network; and the 
blocking of more than ten Chinese invest-
ment projects as well as restrictions in 
fields such as infrastructure, agriculture 
and animal husbandry. 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison enjoys 
strikingly strong support for his China 
policy, despite the enormous pressure 
applied by China and Australia’s great 
dependency. In 2020 82 percent of Austral-
ians backed sanctions against Chinese offi-
cials implicated in human rights violations. 
So why are Australians not afraid to stand 
up to China? 
Two factors are significant. Firstly, 
Australian society has been experiencing 
Chinese pressure for some years, and has 
discussed the issue in depth. For many 
Australians obeying Beijing’s demands is 
simply unthinkable. And it helps that many 
Australians are well aware that China de-
pends on Australian resource exports. Bei-
jing can do without Australian wine and 
lobster – but not without Australian iron 
ore, currently priced around US$180/tonne 
versus production costs of about US$10/ 
tonne. Doing without iron ore from Aus-
tralia would have serious repercussions for 
China’s manufacturing and construction 
sectors. No other supplier is in a position 
to replace Australia. 
A Quad Meeting 
In parallel to the G7 meeting, the heads 
of state and government of the Indo-Pacific 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue will also 
meet in Cornwall. Australia, India, Japan 
and the United States held an initial virtual 
summit on 12 March 2021. While military 
cooperation between Australia, Japan and 
the United States is well established, Indian 
participation in the “Pacific NATO” is new 
and reflects growing tensions between 
New Delhi and Beijing. While Prime Minis-
ter Narendra Modi will remain in India on 
account of the prevailing coronavirus situa-
tion, the other three heads of government 
will meet in person in Cornwall. 
At the March meeting it was already 
clear that Washington is determined to 
counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-
Pacific and forging broad alliances to back 
this up. Within just a few months the Biden 
Administration has succeeded in mending 
the rifts left by President Trump and plac-
ing cooperation on a new footing. 
France and the United Kingdom have 
been supporting the Quad with naval 
contingents, although France lays weight 
on operational independence; its nuclear 
attack submarine SNA Emeraude has been 
in the Indo-Pacific since September 2020. 
Concerted action by a large group of coun-
tries sends a clear message: China’s viola-
tions of international law will not be 
accepted. 
This spring London sent a strike group 
to the Pacific, led by the country’s only air-
craft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth. The fleet 
also includes a Dutch frigate and an Ameri-
can destroyer. On board the Queen Elizabeth 
are eighteen F-35B combat aircraft, ten 
from the US Marine Corps and eight from 
the British Royal Air Force. As well as 
demonstrating solidarity and interoperabil-
ity, London, Washington and The Hague 
are also displaying military muscle in East 
Asia. 
Germany’s plans to send the frigate 
Bayern to the Indo-Pacific on a freedom of 
navigation mission appear unconvincing. 
Without embedding in a broader naval 
 
Table 3 
German merchandise imports from and exports to 
Eastern Europe and China in 2019 (€ billion) 
 
 Country Imports Exports Total  
 China  77.0  96.3  173.3  
 Poland  63.6  65.8  129.4  
 Czech Republic  52.7  44.5  97.2  
 Hungary  29.1  26.9  56.0  
 Sum: Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary 
 145.4  137.2  282.6  
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
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formation, the deployment will remain 
symbolic. 
The End of BRICS? 
As well as the leaders of the G7 and Quad, 
two of the five BRICS countries – India and 
South Africa – will also be present at the 
meetings in Cornwall. Even if Prime Minis-
ter Modi will not attend in person, the sig-
nificance of India’s participation is enor-
mous. For decades New Delhi pursued a 
policy of equivocation and led the non-
aligned movement. No longer. After repeated 
spats with China, the Indian government 
has dropped its reservations and turned to 
the West. 
While India’s cooperation with the 
West is flourishing, cooperation among the 
emerging economies has ground to a stand-
still. When the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa) first met in 2009 
some observers saw it becoming a counter-
weight to the G7. That is certainly no longer 
the case. 
The Indian-Chinese relationship is in 
tatters. Brazil’s far right President Jair 
Bolsonaro has shown no interest in deepen-
ing cooperation. China and Russia are all 
that remains of BRICS. So it is hardly sur-
prising that the 13th summit of the BRICS 
states, which India was supposed to host 
in 2021, has been postponed. In view of 
the depth of strife between its two largest 
members, the prospects for cooperation 
within the BRICS group are dim indeed. 
Cornwall: A Turning Point in 
International Relations? 
The preparations for the G7 Summit re-
vealed that Germany stands apart. While 
the United States, France, Japan and the 
United Kingdom have responded to China’s 
growing aggression, Germany continues to 
pursue a policy of close cooperation. Neither 
the illegal security law in Hong Kong nor 
the increasingly obvious human rights vio-
lations in Xinjiang have persuaded Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel to change her funda-
mental position. This was seen very clearly 
at the end of 2020, when Germany pushed 
through the EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment despite grave 
concerns among its European partners and 
Washington’s request to delay signing. 
Germany stresses the importance of re-
maining in dialogue with Beijing, for exam-
ple to discuss climate change (with the 
world’s largest CO2 emitter). On the other 
hand, German export interests are cited as 
justification for conciliatory policy towards 
China. 
Neither line of argument is convincing. 
In the past China has repeatedly failed to 
follow words with deeds. For example in 
trade policy, Beijing has repeatedly post-
poned the implementation of reforms asso-
ciated with its accession to the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001. 
Beijing’s position on climate change is 
also equivocal. Its construction of coal-fired 
power stations in Belt and Road partner 
is hard to reconcile with its Paris climate 
obligations. The Paris Climate Agreement 
of 2015 provides for the CO2 emissions of 
foreign investment to be taken considera-
tion, but there is no sign of this in China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
Beijing is naturally aware of the increas-
ingly hostile mood. It is certainly no coinci-
dence that just ten days before the Cornwall 
Summit President Xi “told senior Com-
munist Party officials it was important to 
present an image of a ‘credible, loveable 
and respectable China’”. But there is no 
sign of Beijing deviating from its policy of 
self-isolation or abandoning the idea of 
“dual circulation”. 
The G7 Summit marks a watershed in 
twenty-first-century international relations. 
The G7 nations – first and foremost the 
United States and United Kingdom – have 
recognised the challenge posed by China 
and are developing new forms of coopera-
tion. If Germany continues to insist on con-
ciliation it risks getting left behind. 
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